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Introduction 
 
This article aims to present to the reader previously unknown narratives of former 
prisoners of war (POWs) immediately following the fall of Tobruk in June 1942. The 
intention is not to explain the events that led to the fall of Tobruk or to lay blame with 
any specific leader or Allied nation involved in the Western Desert Campaign. The focus 
is rather on the events during and following the battle, specifically the experiences of the 
South Africans who were captured and became prisoners of war. Of the 33 000 Allied 
soldiers captured on 21 June 1942, 10 722 were South Africans who were all part of the 
2nd South African Infantry Division under command of Major General H.B. Klopper.1 
Making use of oral testimony, published and unpublished personal memoirs, as well as 
post-war statements found in the Department of Defence Archives and in the Ditsong 
National Museum of Military History, the article hopes to portray events as experienced 
by the ordinary rank and file men, giving a different perspective from that usually 
portrayed in military history publications which for the most part focus on the 
perspectives of those in command. Through this approach it should also become 
possible to extract the individual experience from the general experience, as each of the 
former POWs understood and interpreted what was happening to them in unique ways. 
  
Internationally, research on the historical experience of POWs has increased with 
historians such as Moore and Fedorowich, Hately-Broad, Kochavi, Mackenzie and 
Gilbert beginning to investigate the topic.2 Most of these writers however, approach the 
topic thematically; most look at the treatment of prisoners by their captors. While the 
thematic approach is useful and provides interesting perspectives, the unique views of the 
different nationalities who formed part of the Allied forces are lost, as Australians, 
Canadians, New Zealanders and South Africans are all referred to simply as British or 
Commonwealth forces; this because POW experience is seen as international history 
because the war was fought on a global scale.3 In South Africa, although the focus has 
moved away from pure military history, POW experience has not yet received the same 
attention from local historians. Most of their recent work on World War Two looked at 
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aspects such as economic conditions, race and class relations before, during and after the 
war as well as the political motivations that informed these relations in the pre- and post-
war years.4 However, regimental histories, especially of those regiments that were active 
at Tobruk, often have chapters or sections on the fall of Tobruk, which inevitably then 
also deals to some extent with POW experience. Most notably among these is The Durban 
Light Infantry which devotes 19 chapters to Tobruk.5 Other regimental histories with 
sections or chapters on Tobruk include The Rand Light Infantry; and The History of the 
Transvaal Scottish as well as The Umvoti Mounted Rifles, 1864–1975.6 Of the purely narrative 
works on the South African POW experience, Leigh’s book, Captives Courageous, stands 
out, and although it lacks any form of analysis of POW experience, it presents readers 
with a compilation of POW experiences taken mostly from memoirs, all of which are 
now out of print.7 Paul Schamberger’s Interlude in Switzerland is one of the few other 
publications on South African POW experience, but as the focus is on those who 
escaped from Italy to Switzerland, the German camp experience is omitted.8   
 
The fall of Tobruk 
 
The aim of Operation Crusader in 1941 was to relieve Tobruk and to recapture 
Cyrenaica from the Axis forces. Following two weeks of battle at Sidi Rezegh, Lieutenant 
General Erwin Rommel, Commander of the Afrika Korps, withdrew and Tobruk was 
relieved, but although Operation Crusader was successful in this respect, it came at a high 
price to the South Africans because the entire 5th South African Infantry Brigade was 
lost, with 224 killed, 379 wounded and 3 000 captured from the total force active at Sidi 
Rezegh.9 To authorities, however, these losses were considered insignificant in view of 
the fact that the Afrika Korps lost half their tanks.10 While the 1st South African Infantry 
Division was active in the Crusader battles, the 2nd SA Division was busy digging 
defences around the El Alamein area, and as the 2nd Division had not experienced any 
battles at that stage, their task of digging in the 30 mile bottleneck between the 
Mediterranean Sea and the Qattara Depression was met by some with disappointment 
and frustration because they wanted to become involved in active warfare, or be 
“blooded”, as it was known by the men. Their duties however soon acquired a more 
prominent role as Tobruk became the responsibility of the SA 2nd Division under 
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Klopper’s command when Rommel withdrew in December 1941.11 During the months 
preceding the fall of Tobruk the men in the 2nd Division gained limited battle experience 
in the Benghazi Handicap and the Gazala Gallop during the initial phases of the Desert 
Campaign.12 The task of the 2nd Division became increasingly difficult on 14 June when 
the Commander of the 8th Army, Lieutenant General N.M. Ritchie, ordered the 
withdrawal of the 1st SA Division and the British 50th Division to allow the 8th Army to 
rally its strength.13  
 
With regard to the defence of Tobruk, General Sir Claude J.E. Auchinleck, 
Commander in Chief in the Middle East, wanted brigades to operate independently from 
divisions in an effort to ensure greater mobility, but Ritchie preferred a system of 
immobile defensive boxes along a line that ran from Gazala to Bir Hakeim, a stretch of 
80 kilometres that became known as the Gazala line. Minefields were a vital part in the 
success of this system, but they were deficient, because “minefields had not been 
maintained and defensive positions had filled with sand”,14 according to Michael de Lisle 
who served with the 2nd Anti-Aircraft Regiment. A.J. Cremer, attached to the 2nd SA 
Division and member of the Divisional Headquarters, also mentioned in his memoirs the 
bad state of the minefields and that the mines themselves were so old that they were 
completely ineffective.15 Furthermore, the two defensive boxes towards the south of the 
line were very far apart from each other and therefore unable to repel Rommel’s advance 
effectively.16 When Rommel attacked, he bypassed the Gazala line, which put the South 
Africans at a disadvantage because they had their backs towards the Afrika Korps. 
Rommel’s Stuka dive bombers, Mark III and IV tanks, and the use of superior German 
anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, put the Germans in a position to defeat the Allied forces 
in Tobruk.17 Klopper was left to defend the harbour with “insufficient anti-aircraft and 
anti-tank guns” because the 8th Army was in retreat after the Battle of Gazala.18  
 
For most in the 2nd Division, the battle at Tobruk was a chaotic experience 
characterised by conflicting orders. Many former POWs described the battle as frenzied 
and confused, mostly due to the fact that many of them were unaware of the full extent 
of events in the battlefield because it was spread out over such a wide area. In his 
memoirs, Ike Rosmarin, a war correspondent with the 2nd SA Division, described the 
attack as “terrifying [but] worst of all was the fact that we did not know what was 
happening as there were no orders from our officers. Confusion reigned with fear and 
panic”.19 The dire situation is further emphasised by Private Gert Daniel van Zyl with the 
1st South African Police Regiment, whose official statement on 19 January 1944 said he 
heard the BBC announce that Tobruk was besieged and no longer of strategic 
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importance. While it seems strange that the BBC would contradict Churchill, who two 
weeks before the fall of Tobruk sent a note to Auchinleck that Tobruk had to remain in 
Allied hands because this was vital to prevent Axis forces from entering Egypt, one can 
only assume that the BBC was attempting to influence the British public should the 
Allies suffer a defeat in North Africa.20 At the time, Van Zyl did not even realise that 
Tobruk was in any danger and the BBC message must have added to his confusion.21 On 
20 June, Van Zyl and the rest of the men in the 1st South Africa Police Brigade (1 SAP) 
was ordered to hand in their equipment, but an hour later the same equipment was re-
issued to them. During the evening of 20 June they were told to move towards the coast 
as the Navy would come to their rescue, however, there were no clear orders and some 
men began to destroy their rifles while others simply walked away into the desert. Van 
Zyl described the men as “sheep without a shepherd”.22 
  
According to Fannin, at 16:00 on 20 June, the order of “every man for himself” 
was given, but his statement shows that after this order, attempts were still being made to 
contact regiments and to give orders, such as one to send out a “tank-hunting” force 
during the night. Fannin went on foot to inform Brigadier Johnson of the order, but 
found him “quite unperturbed ... the HQ was having tea ...” Problems were compounded 
during the night of 20 June when disagreements among the commanding officers 
resulted in a tentative decision to continue fighting but to allow commanding officers to 
surrender if they thought it necessary.23 Ammunition and weapon supplies were another 
point of contention and according to Klopper the lack thereof was “the fatal factor” in 
his decision to surrender.24 Many former POWs supported this view, for instance Fred 
Geldenhuis of The Second Transvaal Scottish said that they had no weapons whatsoever, 
and that not a single shot was fired from his position when the Germans came through.25 
In contrast with the widely held opinion that there was a shortage of ammunition at 
Tobruk, Captain Fannin stated during an interview in 1946 that “there was plenty of amn 
[ammunition] in Tobruk, the only serious shortage was in shells for the medium arty 
[artillery].”26 This view is supported by Major N. Wessels, Commander of the 6th South 
African Light Anti-Aircraft Battery, who said in his interview in 1946 that the 
ammunition supply was adequate.27 The matter of the perceived shortage of ammunition 
may be explained to an extent by Colonel H. McA. Richards, Commander of the 
Divisional Artillery, who told of one officer who was responsible for issuing ammunition 
who insisted on authority to do so from Headquarters, even though the German tanks 
were already visible and approaching fast at the time.28  
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Evading capture   
 
The confusion regarding orders resulted in many men taking matters into their own 
hands in an effort to evade capture. According to Jack Mortlock of Die Middelandse 
Regiment (DMR), the Germans advanced at such speed that by the time information and 
orders reached them they were inaccurate or no longer relevant.29 Mortlock’s memoirs 
also give insight into the influence of rumours on the battlefield: 
  
It is said that General Klopper received, but did not succeed in transmitting to all 
units, the order to fight their way out if they could, and if not, to resist to the last. 
We certainly did not receiver orders to this effect, even though General Klopper 
was at our Brigade Headquarters!30 
 
The indecision and disagreements between those in command affected everyone 
at Tobruk. For instance, the Cape Town Highlanders received an order that: “If anyone 
leaves Tobruk now, they’ll be classified as a deserter.” One of the Cape Town 
Highlanders, Gordon Fry, believed that had an order of “every man for himself” been 
given, he would have been able to evade capture, something that deeply troubled him 
throughout his time as a POW.31 On the other hand, H.L. Wood, who was stationed with 
the H.Q. Company of the Umvoti Mounted Rifles, simply took it for granted that it was 
a case of every man for himself and attempted to get away, as did many others.32 In his 
statement of 1943, Colonel du Plessis said “we who were at Divisional H.Q. were told 
that H.Q. staff was clearing out and that it was ‘every man for himself”’.33 Gilbert points 
out that British rank and file did not submit easily to capture, regardless of orders from 
their superiors. In many cases men would ensure that they were caught with no 
ammunition in an effort not appear cowardly, as the lack of ammunition provided them 
with a valid and justifiable reason for surrender.34  
 
As the Germans approached, many men “dispersed in all directions” before they 
were even aware that Tobruk had fallen, while others who stayed put were informed by 
German troops that Klopper had surrendered.35 Some escapees were lucky enough to 
find abandoned vehicles, which were driven towards Allied lines until their petrol 
supplies were exhausted. However, a few of these escape attempts were successful, such 
as was the case with two men of the Royal Durban Light Infantry, Goldman and Spear. 
After a few close encounters with German forces, they reached Allied lines on 29 June 
1942.36 In a letter to his family, John Davidson of the 7th Field Battery told of a Guards 
Major who refused to surrender and escaped with a “crowd of men”. In the same letter 
he also mentioned Allan Bird who “just dashed through a minefield path” with an 
ambulance and a truck. According to Davidson, it was actually possible to drive through 
Italian camps; “you just drive through and wave and cheer – the Ities [Italians] are usually 
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so surprised that they just wave back”.37 Other successful escapes from Tobruk included 
Lieutenant C.R. Featherstone of the DMR who escaped with 46 men, and Sergeant 
Woodley and nine others who escaped by hiding in caves and living on abandoned 
German rations.38  
 
When Dick Dickinson of the 2nd Transvaal Scottish Battalion attempted to 
escape, it was less successful. Dickinson and his friend, Rollo van der Burg came across 
an injured South African of the Non-European Army Services (NEAS) and convinced a 
German soldier that they had to take the man to hospital in the German’s truck. For 
some inexplicable reason the he agreed and Dickinson, Van der Burg and the injured 
man set off in the truck. From the start their attempt was doomed because they had no 
idea in which direction to travel or where the minefields were. As they proceeded, those 
trying to escape on foot climbed onto their truck until it was completely overloaded. 
Somewhere along the road the injured man disappeared and when they were again 
stopped by Germans they were detained.39 In many cases men found themselves lost in 
the desert with diminishing food and water supplies, walking in circles and searching for 
the Allies. When the Germans eventually caught up with them, most were relieved 
because they realised the desert was a far more deadly enemy than the Axis forces. 
  
Rommel considered the fall of Tobruk on 21 June 1941 the high point of the war 
in North Africa and as a reward he was promoted to field marshal.40 For South Africa 
and the Allies, the fall of Tobruk was disastrous and rumours about South African 
incompetence threatened to further sour relations between South Africa and the United 
Kingdom.41 Relations between the two countries had become strained before the war, 
most notably as a result of the creation of South Africa’s Seaward Defence Force (SDF) 
which eventually led to the setting up of the South African Naval Forces in 1942.42 The 
SDF and the neutrality crisis of 1938 and 1939 were evidence of a growing sense of 
nationalism that was not unique to South Africa, but also gained momentum during the 
war in all dominions as they were seeking a greater sense of independence from their 
erstwhile colonial masters.43 The impact of the surrender had far reaching consequences; 
Auchinleck’s subsequent report complicated the matter because it included references to 
the Tobruk garrison that the South African government found unacceptable.44 In an 
effort to control “uninformed criticism”, rumours and German propaganda, the South 
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African High Commissioner suggested that authentic accounts from survivors be made 
public in South Africa and the United Kingdom, but only if these accounts exonerated 
Klopper. It had been suggested that  
 
Klopper was guilty of treachery [and] it [was] a fact that no government 
spokesman has made any appreciative or sympathetic reference to Klopper … 
[Furthermore, the] decision to hold Tobruk against the whole force of Rommel 
while the 8th Army disappeared eastwards into the blue and thus was unable to 
assist the defence [was highly questionable].45  
 
Those captured at Tobruk, however, did not see or hear any of the immediate political, 
press or public reaction to the events of the battle; they formed a general opinion of 
Klopper, based on their experience, which was extremely negative. Shortly after arriving 
at the POW camp in Derna, Rosmarin described how Klopper was brought to the 
enclosure by German officers to address the prisoners,  
 
but the prisoners of war, especially those from the British forces, were in no mood 
to listen to someone whom they thought had betrayed them. They were in an 
angry and belligerent mood and, amid boos and hisses, Klopper did an about turn 
without saying a word.46 
By the time the POWs reached Italy, the negativity towards Klopper and Tobruk 
had altered and South African rank and file POWs often experienced hostility from 
especially British and Australian POWs.47 The fact that all South Africans volunteered for 
the Union Defence Force, and were not conscripted, must have emphasised the feelings 
of resentment from fellow POWs.48  
 
Making sense of capture 
 
Understandably, memoirs and interviews of all former POWs revealed a sense of shock, 
humiliation and exasperation at becoming POWs. While some, like Clive Luyt of the 2nd 
Anti-Aircraft Regiment, blamed Klopper because he “was straight from a desk in 
Pretoria”,49 others, like Fred van Alphen Stahl, also of the 2nd Anti-Aircraft Regiment, 
felt aggrieved at becoming a prisoner because he was not fighting at the time of his 
capture. During the interview Stahl described his experience as follows: 
 
... of course your first feelings as a prisoner of war, this is the end, you imagined 
going to the army you could lose an arm, you could lose your life, you could lose 
your legs, your sight, but you never gave prisoner of war a thought, and so this, 
this is the end, I haven’t ... I wasn’t busy fighting at the time.  I wasn’t fighting at 
the time, we had been fighting in the Gazala handicap and on the rearguard 
coming back, and they said right now you are all moving ... we didn’t even realise 
it was Tobruk ... and the next morning ... a signal just came in and they said 
destroy your guns, destroy your vehicles, Tobruk has fallen, you are now prisoners 
of war.50 
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Seen from another point of view, Wood, in his memoirs, described the 
disappointment felt by Captain De Jager of the Umvoti Mounted Rifles, who “with tear-
filled eyes” conveyed the order to surrender.51 Sergeant Goldman stated that when he 
was told that “they have surrendered”, he thought “they” were German forces. When he 
realised that it was in fact the Allies who had surrendered, he said he was “astounded and 
flabbergasted. I had not for a moment thought that we would surrender. It seemed 
fantastic. We had not fired a shot”.52 Stanley Smollan of the Transvaal Scottish Regiment, 
was unfortunate enough to return to Tobruk after recovering from an injury in Cairo, 
arriving the day before it fell,53 while David Brokensha, a dispatch rider with the 2nd 
South African Signal Company, was literally captured with his pants down, swimming 
naked in the sea after sharing a bottle of gin with his brother Paul and four others who 
believed they could swim to freedom following the surrender order. Brokensha’s capture 
was therefore humiliating on many different levels. Firstly he was part of a surrendering 
army; secondly they failed to escape; and thirdly he felt “embarrassed, not only at being a 
hands-upper, but also because I was ‘starko’ – as though this were not the right script; 
people did not get captured without clothes”.54 After experiencing heavy fighting during 
the week before the fall of Tobruk at Point 209, also known as Commonwealth Keep, 
Mortlock simply stated that “continued resistance appeared hopeless” and they obeyed 
the order of destroying their weapons and documents.55 Surrender was synonymous with 
the destruction of weapons and for everyone this was a difficult task to carry out. During 
interviews, former POWs had no difficulty in recalling this detailed process, while at 
other times they could not remember seemingly obvious elements, such as the names of 
the camps were they were held. De Lisle’s description shows the respect many had for 
their equipment: 
  
the thing to do is to put a shell in the muzzle of the barrel and then fire a round at 
it, well that just blew apart the muzzle of the barrel and didn’t destroy the breach 
mechanism and that was good, solid, beautiful hard steel so we had to take the 
breach mechanism to bits and bury it in different places...56  
 
The shock of becoming a prisoner was followed by days of mental and physical 
hardship under Italian captors. Although the Germans captured the men, they 
immediately handed over their prisoners to the Italian forces who were responsible for 
the confinement of POWs, mostly in camps in Tobruk, Gazala, Tarhunah, Derna, 
Benghazi and Mersa Matruh. These were all transit camps and most POWs ended up in 
Benghazi before being transported to Italy. While most camps were simple wire 
enclosures with Italian and Senussi guards posted on the perimeter, there were 
exceptions, such as the graveyard in Derna where most POWs spent a night on their way 
to Benghazi. At this early stage of captivity no Red Cross delegates inspected any of the 
camps, and the conditions in the North African camps were so bad that POWs were 
mainly concerned with basic survival needs and only later began to concern themselves 
with the stipulations of the 1929 Geneva Convention. Similarly, faced with an 
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unexpected high number of POWs and inadequate temporary camps, the Italians did not 
regard the Geneva Convention as a priority at this time.57  
 
Views of the enemy and of each other  
 
Before the events at Tobruk, some South Africans came across German and Italian 
prisoners of war and formed initial impressions of their adversaries. Mortlock described 
Italian POWs as behaving like animals while he thought the Germans “carried 
themselves [in POW camps] with that characteristic air of superiority that seemed second 
nature to the German Army at that time”.58 Opinions about Italians were also formed 
when South Africans raided abandoned dug-outs at Mersa Matruh, Sidi Barrani, Sollum, 
Halfaya Pass and Bardia. According to Rosmarin it was “no wonder that the ‘Ities’ 
[Italians] were looked on as inferior to the Germans”,59 as they often found women’s 
clothing and condoms in the dug-outs. Stahl also attested to finding condoms in Italian 
quarters in Abyssinia, but to him the hygiene of the Italians was of greater concern; he 
said that the Italians “would rather cover themselves with scent and powder, than use 
soap to wash ... so they were probably used to being lousy from time to time”. The 
distinction between their Italian and German enemies did not change much when the 
South Africans found themselves in POW camps. When Brokensha was captured, the 
Germans admitted that they considered the South Africans, and themselves, to be good 
soldiers, but that the Italians were not, therefore they felt obliged to apologise for 
handing them over to the Italians.60 Apologies such as these were not limited to Tobruk, 
but also took place at Sidi Rezegh where Bernard Schwikkard of the 3rd Transvaal 
Scottish was captured. According to Schwikkard: 
  
General Rommel, the famous German Commander, drove up to us and said he 
was sorry to be handing us over to the Italians, but he needed all his soldiers to do 
the fighting. He indicated that as soldiers, the Italians were a miserable lot.61 
  
It is possible that Rommel’s reputation as an excellent soldier influenced POWs’ 
attitude towards German soldiers and guards.62 Brokensha, who experienced no fighting 
before he was captured at Tobruk, said in his interview that Rommel “was our favourite 
General, I won’t say our only favourite German General ... he had a very good name as a 
proper soldier, and very efficient”. The apparent respect Brokensha held for Rommel, 
did not, however, confuse his loyalties because he firmly believed that “we were the 
British, the Allies, we were going to defeat the bastards”.63 While most English-speaking 
South Africans found the German apology regarding the Italians mildly ironic, between 
some Afrikaans-speaking South Africans and Germans there was an even greater chance 
of mutual association because many Afrikaans POWs were of German ancestry. Shortly 
after his capture, Cremer noticed a German soldier speaking Afrikaans to the POWs. The 
soldier was a South African student in Germany before the war and joined the German 
Army in 1939. The fact that South Africans were fighting on opposite sides while 
speaking the same language made a big impression on the Afrikaans-speaking Cremer, 
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but this by no means meant that he questioned his own loyalty or nationality.64 Dennis 
Mugglestone of the 6th Infantry Police Brigade also remembered recognising two South 
Africans, Van der Westhuizen and Le Roux, among the German guards. As an English-
speaking South African, Mugglestone regarded these two as traitors and he was offended 
when they tried to enter into a conversation with him.65 On the other hand, Stahl’s 
German origins did not affect his South African identity, because he believed that the 
“Germans were bastards, but they were just bastards”.66 In complete contrast, Wessel 
Oosthuizen of the Police Brigade regarded the Germans as a proud nation and in some 
way regarded the British as the enemy because of stories told to him about the South 
African War of 1899–1902.67 In most cases, the idea of Italians as inferior made 
accepting their POW status harder and in a few instances led to blatant defiance towards 
Italian guards. While being transported on a truck, Cremer and those with him became so 
irritated with their young guard who insisted on singing and whistling while firing shots 
at random targets in the desert, that one of the POWs grabbed his rifle and threw it into 
bushes next to the road. The guard was terrified and banged on the roof to alert the 
driver but he was ignored – or the driver was himself too terrified to stop the truck. 
When the POWs arrived at their camp, they disappeared into the already crowded camp 
and no action was taken against them.68 In some cases, confronting the enemy after 
capture led to potentially dangerous situations, as was the case with Stahl, who together 
with De Lisle, was transported on a truck towards Derna. Stahl felt a sense of frustration 
and was offended by the Italians who had the audacity, according to him, to jeer at the 
prisoners. He described the Italians as 
  
funny looking little people with great big helmets and clothes that didn’t fit and 
unshaven ... and one, but he was particularly annoying, laughing and jeering at us 
and waiving his rifle, and I said to old Michael de Lisle, he was a bit of a linguist, I 
said to him what’s ice-cream in Italian and he said gelati – and I pointed to this 
chap who was waiving his rifle around and I said ‘two gelati tingelingeling’ and he 
got so mad ... he fired two shots in the air, or one shot in the air – and I just 
wondered whether my big mouth could have got us into trouble there could have 
got somebody shot that day.69 
 
On another occasion Stahl used a form of reverse psychology against the Italians 
in an effort to protect prisoners’ rights. When a bombardier had his watch taken by an 
Italian guard, Stahl said to an Italian officer 
  
“I thought you Italians were all the same, honourable people” and he said: “So we 
are, so we are!”, and I said: “Well that man over there has taken my friend’s 
watch”. And then he called this chap over, he got the watch back from him, gave 
him a slap through the face and handed the watch back.70 
 
In some instances, the Germans even sided with the South Africans against the 
Italians, as was the case when G.H. Collet, of the DMR, saw an Italian guard offering 
bread in exchange for watches or fountain pens. When a German saw this he took the 
loot from the Italian and threw it over the fence, resulting in humiliation for the Italian as 
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the POWs clearly enjoyed this event. Collet states in his memoirs that “this incident 
epitomized the difference in the German and Italian behaviour to us as prisoners of 
war”.71 The Italians also used the local population to guard the POW camps and these 
guards seemed to have had no mercy or humanity towards the prisoners. None of the 
accounts by POWs reveal any vestige of goodwill between the Senussi and the prisoners. 
In his memoirs, L.G. Tupper of the Kaffrarian Rifles, described them as “a lot of black 
Senussi bastards guarding us and they would shoot for the slightest provocation. I 
remember one chap who showed them the ‘V’ for victory sign and was shot”.72 This 
description probably reflects most POWs feelings towards these people. Rosmarin 
described the Senussi guards at Benghazi as “raw desert natives” whose behaviour only 
increased the tension between the captives and captors.73 Mortlock’s description of them 
goes one step further as he dehumanises them by comparing them to animals who 
  
endeavoured to make their wishes known by bashing you about with a rifle butt. I 
believe there were cases of prisoners being shot by these creatures. Furthermore, 
if they noticed watches, fountain pens etc, these were immediately ripped off. It 
was indeed a lucky thing for the Senussis that none of the prisoners whom they 
handled were in the victorious Eighth Army advance in the latter part of 1942.74  
 
Whatever their opinion of the Italian guards, many South Africans were reduced 
to begging for water and food during the first few days in transit camps, as was the case 
in the Derna graveyard, where the water taps were on the outside, forcing POWs to 
plead with the guards for water. According to Cremer, the guards became irritated with 
the constant begging and started shouting insults at the prisoners. When a prisoner 
returned an insult, the guard reacted by shooting into the crowd, killing one of the 
prisoners. The prisoners reacted by storming the fence at which juncture the guard ran 
away. When the Italian officer asked the prisoners to bury the man, they refused as they 
felt they were not responsible for his death.75  
 
In the Tobruk camp, POWs also died at the hands of Italians who seemed to take 
advantage of their position of power. Private Connely was shot by an Italian 
commandant who ordered him to move away from the fence. Although Connely obeyed, 
the commandant shot him in the back. On another occasion, Private Myles was severely 
injured while looking for a toilet when an Italian guard threw a bomb into the camp.76 
Brokensha experienced a similar feeling of resentment towards Italian guards at Derna 
where he was kept in crowded army barracks. As the prisoners were being counted by 
Italian guards, he and a friend became impatient when the guards seemed incapable of 
counting the prisoners without making mistakes. Brokensha and his friend “flinched 
away from [the guard’s] grubby paw” as the guard clapped his hand on their shoulders 
while counting. Brokensha believes that their “refined reaction” offended the guard and 
afterwards they were taken to a small office where an Italian lieutenant “smelling of 
perfume and soap” pretentiously displayed his revolver. The guard then slapped both 
Brokensha and his friend in their faces as punishment. According to Brokensha, “the 
slaps didn’t really hurt, what was hurt was our youthful pride. I was furious – and 
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powerless”.77 For many, the Italians’ blatant disregard of the POWs’ rights on medical 
matters increased their dislike of the Italians. In his memoirs De Lisle also pointed out 
how the Italian doctor at Benghazi spent most of his time discussing prices for loot taken 
from POWs by an Italian corporal rather than paying attention to their medical 
requirements.78  
 
Some POWs did realise however, that the terrible conditions in the camps in 
North Africa was a result of the unexpected number of POWs taken and apparently 
forgave the Italians. Smollan was shocked when he noticed the poor state of the Italians, 
especially with regard to their equipment, transport, rations and the fact that Italian 
troops had no socks, but were given pieces of cloth to put in their boots. Smollan 
emphasised that “the Italians were a very kindly people … in Africa it was very bad, 
things were very bad and I can’t blame the Italians because I think they did what they 
could”.79 De Lisle expressed similar views, saying that their Italian captors “proved 
inefficient, capricious, and unable to provide us with the necessities of life because they 
had very little for themselves”.80 It is important to note, however, that both Smollan and 
De Lisle escaped in Italy following Mussolini’s capitulation and they became dependant 
on Italian peasant families for their survival. Their view of the Italians in Africa is 
therefore probably clouded by their subsequent experiences in Italy. For others though, it 
was simply a question of colour. Schwikkard explained the Italian behaviour toward the 
POWs as being related to how dark or light the Italians were, saying 
  
we disrespected them and the result is that ... I never regained respect for them, 
except the fact that I realised afterwards that most of these people ... were from 
the South of Italy and not the North. South of Italy are peasants and so on, you 
know they are the darker people and ... they are from Naples.81 
 
Similarly, South African soldiers belonging to the NEAS and the Cape Corps 
where seen by many white soldiers, as well as by the government of the day, as inferior to 
white soldiers.82 The superior attitude of white soldiers towards others can often be 
detected in the negative way they compared the behaviour of the Italians to that of South 
African blacks, indicating that they viewed both Italians and non-Europeans as inferior. 
Cremer, for instance, described how two young Italian guards carried on a very loud 
conversation “as if they were 50 steps away from each other – just like our Bantus are 
used to shouting at each other!”83 Although most South African POWs looked down on 
their Italian captors, not all of them compared Italians to black or coloured South 
Africans. While many white POWs expressed paternalistic or blatantly racist views 
regarding other races, genuinely good relationships did exist, such as that between Ben 
Hermer, a medical officer with the 17th South African Field Ambulance, and his batman, 
July Monaremi. When the two of them were captured at Tobruk, they were put into 
separate POW camps, and Hermer described their last conversation as a “bitter goodbye; 
there were tears in July’s eyes and in mine too ... my heart was heavy as I knew I would 
                                   
77.  Brokensha, Brokie’s Way, p 75. 
78.  De Lisle, Over the Hills and Far Away, p 25. 
79.  Interview with Stanley Smollan conducted by author, Johannesburg, 15 March 2010. 
80.  De Lisle, Over the Hills and Far Away, p 19. 
81.  Interview with Bernard Schwikkard conducted by author, Johannesburg, 17 March 2010. 
82.  Gilbert, POW Allied Prisoners, pp 207–208. 
83.  Cremer, Oorlogsherinneringe, p 21. ‘... asof hulle minstens 50 treë van mekaar verwyder was – net soos ons 
Bantoes gewoond was om vir mekaar te skree!’ 
Horn – South African POW experiences after Tobruk 
 
106 
 
never see him again and I didn’t”.84 Oosthuizen, on the other hand, described lying next 
to black patients in the Alexandria hospital as a very strange experience: “the black head 
and the white sheets, it just didn’t fit, you know.”85 It is clear that the relationship 
between South Africans of different race groups cannot be generalised, because some 
express racist attitudes in their memoirs while others emphasise the good relationship 
they had with each other. The fact that no living former black or coloured POWs could 
be found for interview purposes, and that none of their written memoirs appear to be 
available, provides a one-sided view of the race situation during the war.  
 
German and Italian forces displayed a complete disregard for the rights of black 
and coloured POWs as they did not view them as regular troops. Many non-European 
soldiers from different parts of the Commonwealth endured bad treatment from their 
captors, and several were shot if they gave too much trouble.86 Mugglestone recalled how 
black soldiers were shot by German guards while being marched to the POW camp 
following the fall of Tobruk. Apparently the soldiers “were too drunk to move any 
further, and the Jerries [Germans] could not be worried. This was the result of the liquor 
they stole from Battalion HQ the previous night.”87 In the Tobruk camp, black South 
African POWs were forced “under threat of death” to do war work, which was contrary 
to the Geneva Convention.88 Another report claims that Indian and black prisoners at 
Tobruk were not allowed to take cover in shelters when the town was bombed by the 
Allied forces. Furthermore, their food was totally inadequate – they were only given one 
packet of British Army biscuits per day and water rations were kept to a minimum – this 
while they were being assaulted by both German and Italian guards who supervised the 
war work they were doing.89 On the other hand, black servicemen could not rely on 
sympathy from fellow South Africans either, as is illustrated by Cremer, who saw a black 
man shooting at Stuka dive bombers using a small Italian gun in the midst of the Tobruk 
battle. Cremer made no effort to help the man or to take him to the Headquarters, 
towards which Cremer was heading. The black man was left in the desert shooting 
straight up at the bombers, while Cremer “could only laugh” at the absurdity of the 
situation.90  
 
There were also examples of black South Africans escaping together with whites 
from the perimeters of Tobruk when it was about to fall, as was the case with 
Featherstone who escaped with 46 men, including six non-Europeans.91 Some black 
soldiers showed surprising loyalty to the cause despite the discriminatory treatment they 
received. One such example was Job Maseko who was captured at Tobruk and decided 
to sabotage the enemy “because of our ill-treatment by the enemy, especially the Italians, 
and because I felt it a duty in this way to assist my own people”. Maseko was one of the 
soldiers who were off-loading military equipment in the Tobruk harbour and as he had 
experience of working with explosives, he put this knowledge to use by assembling a 
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bomb using jerry cans, straw and petrol, resulting in the ship being destroyed.92 The fact 
that black and coloured troops were being used to do war work on the docks also held an 
advantage because they had the opportunity to acquire food, something white prisoners 
in camps could not do. De Lisle recalled how these men would return from the harbour 
with haversacks filled with mealiemeal, and “the unfortunate consequence was that 
hungry English and even S[outh] Africans would lay siege to their tents at night to beg 
the crumbs of their charity”.93 
 
Camp conditions  
 
As the Red Cross did not visit any of the camps in North Africa, there are no official 
reports on the living conditions in these camps and information has been gleaned from 
interviews, memoirs, diaries and to a lesser extent from The Benghazi Forum, a camp 
newspaper started by Eric Hurst, a British POW.94 Many POWs consider their 
experiences in North African as dehumanising, referring to the camps as “cages”.95 
Maintaining a sense of dignity became a daily struggle, because living conditions 
worsened and most POWs lost on average between 20 and 30 kilograms in weight as a 
result of food shortages while in North Africa. Because there were so many prisoners, 
the distribution of food was a long process and after standing in line for hours, the 
POWs were always disappointed when they received their rations. In Derna the biscuits 
were so hard that Reverend Major Patrick J. Nolan asked an Italian guard to break the 
biscuit with his bayonet. The Italian replied that Nolan should soak the biscuit in water, 
but by that time the water had run out.96 Often POWs received tins of bully beef, but 
these had to be shared between two or three of them.97 The shortage of food forced 
POWs to look for food elsewhere and on one occasion Collet was desperate and lucky 
enough to catch and eat a mole.98 Dickinson’s diary probably gives the most accurate 
description of the food POWs received: 
 
Our daily ration is a tin of bully-beef and a small loaf of bread, the size of a large 
hot-cross bun, per man. The bully-beef is 300 grams. About every third day we are 
given a hot meal which is a pint and a half of stew, but which is mostly rice. When 
we get this meal, our bully is cut to half a tin.99 
 
For Dickinson, the lack of food was an indication of the bad state of the enemy 
forces, a view shared by Brokensha who emphasised that the Italians were not ready to 
accommodate the huge numbers of POWs.100 However, at the time Brokensha did not 
see the lack of food as a result of bad organisational skill, but of pure maliciousness. 
When an Italian guard, who had slapped him earlier the same day, offered him some 
water, Brokensha refused because he believed his treatment was the result of animosity 
towards South Africans. However, Brokensha’s older brother, Paul, convinced him to 
accept the water and Brokensha, his youthful pride protesting, eventually accepted the 
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water and shared it with his brother and the others in their group.101 Prisoners who were 
caught stealing, especially those who stole food, were severely punished by fellow POWs, 
as was the case with two British POWs who were chained to a gate for 24 hours without 
food or water.102  
 
It was probably during this time in the North African camps that POWs 
established friendships that would last throughout their imprisonment, because everyone 
learnt to share resources, especially food and water. POWs also had to trust one another 
because food rations often had to be shared and each morsel of food became very 
important. Stahl and De Lisle were two such friends who were part of a group of four 
who supported each other during their stay in Benghazi and Derna. In his memoirs De 
Lisle pointed out that during his days in the Army he was never able to establish such 
close friendships, but that the “need for mutual support” in POW camps made such 
friendships a necessity.103 High ranking officers like Klopper were separated from the 
rank and file at an early stage, but among the other ranks, it quickly became apparent that 
rank no longer mattered because in the camps it was a matter of “dog-eat-dog”.104 
Rosmarin was amazed at how quickly “Army apartheid” evaporated when he saw his 
commanding officer at the transit camp in Tobruk “too dispirited even to shoo away a 
mangy desert dog which was lifting his leg on his mackintosh”.105    
 
In most transit camps POWs were accommodated in tents, but in Benghazi some 
of the camps used converted barracks which were equipped with electricity. Hygiene, 
however, was a problem in all camps and POWs quickly became infested with lice and 
infected with dysentery. The toilet facilities were hopelessly inadequate and at some 
camps POWs were not allowed to go the toilets at night; instead they had to use small 
tins, a completely inadequate measure. In an attempt to solve the problem, a trench of 
about four meters was dug and a box with holes was placed over the trench. Toilet paper 
was simply non-existent and any paper found was reserved for those suffering from 
dysentery.106  
 
In contrast to memoirs and interviews, The Benghazi Forum paints a very different 
picture of life in the camp. In the first edition of 4 November 1942, the editor claimed 
that “there has been produced from chaos, law and order, efficient food and water 
supply; regular concerts with original material ... Arts and Crafts Exhibition; [and] a well 
organised Farmers’ Association”.107 For the most part the newspaper focused on 
organisational aspects of the camps; biographies of inmates; and reports on concerts or 
sporting events. The tone of the articles was optimistic and even humorous and was 
clearly aimed at raising the morale of the prisoners. 
 
Escape in North Africa  
 
While the prisoners in Benghazi tried to make the best of their situation, the Allied forces 
were ordered to bomb Benghazi harbour continuously because it was an important 
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supply line for the Axis forces in the desert.108 It was ironic that the Allied bombing of 
the Benghazi harbour worsened the situation for POWs as far as food supplies were 
concerned, but it also kept their hopes up because they believed Allies would soon 
liberate them. Camp rumours were almost as frequent as the bombs in the harbour and 
in most cases only served to confuse prisoners. Tupper recalled that: 
  
one day we heard rumours that Alexandria was taken. The Wogs were very excited 
and told us that they would soon be on holiday in that city. We were very down in 
the dumps but still had faith in that our bombers were still coming to bomb the 
harbour.109  
 
De Lisle remembered the rumours in Benghazi with mixed emotions because he 
recalled only one incident when the rumours were true and that  
 
every other day there’d be a story of an Arab trader passing a message through 
over the fence with a loaf of bread, I think the enemy fostered these rumours to 
try and break our morale, raise our hopes and then dash them.110 
 
The toilet facilities afforded no privacy and because they were in constant use 
became centres of information. Mortlock remembers that the “rumours or 
‘latrineograms’ ... dogged our footsteps for as long as we were prisoners of war.”. 
Because most POWs were in a state of confusion, it was very difficult for anyone to 
determine the reliability of these rumours, dividing the camps into optimists and 
pessimists. However, Mortlock recalled that these “rumours were generally reputed to 
have come from reliable sources from outside the camp, and that it would only be a 
matter of days before we would be released”.111 Many POWs believed that the Allied 
forces were planning an elaborate scheme to free them, and when the Italians started to 
transport POWs from Benghazi to Italy, many tried to postpone their departure, hoping 
to be liberated before they found themselves in Europe. De Lisle believes his group 
missed being liberated by four days, an opinion supported by some in the DMR, who left 
Benghazi four days before the 8th Army reached that city.112 Others who did not believe 
the rumours could not wait to get to Italy because they believed the camp conditions 
there would be better.  
 
On average, the Tobruk POWs spent five months in North African camps, but 
this was a long time to live on rumour, hard biscuits and bully beef, and a few POWs 
decided to escape and take their chances in the desert. Most POWs believed escape 
would be too dangerous because they did not have sufficient water or food and they 
were not sure of the local population’s loyalties. Failed escapes were also a big deterrent. 
One such case was a prisoner who was trying to cut through the wire fence and was shot 
by an Italian guard. The corpse was left hanging on the fence as a warning.113 Others 
decided to take the risk as did Sergeant Dawie van der Merwe and Gunner Louw. While 
their accomplices distracted the Italian guards with exchanging boots for cigarettes, Louw 
and Van der Merwe made their escape. After several days in the desert, the two were 
apparently betrayed by a Senussi tribesman and they found themselves back in camp, 
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shackled as punishment.114 Other attempts were more successful and some who escaped 
from POW camps met up with those who had evaded capture after the fall of Tobruk. In 
most cases meeting friendly Senussi travellers was a vital aspect in the success of the 
escape. Lieutenant L.A.H.R. Bailie and Sergeant “Toys” Norton of the Kaffrarian Rifles 
escaped and reached a New Zealand battalion at Ruweisat Ridge. Bailie’s experience of 
the generosity of the Senussi was expressed in an interview with the East London Daily 
Dispatch some time later. According to Bailie: 
  
the friendship and charity extended to us by these four primitive souls was 
touching, and presented an object lesson which if studied and carried into effect 
by the so-called ‘advanced’ and civilised races of this world, would do much to put 
an end to avarice.115  
 
Another successful escape was from a temporary camp at Mersa Matruh by 
Reuben Maloyi of the 15th South African Field Ambulance. While unloading 
ammunition for German forces, Maloyi and a friend escaped through a weak point in the 
fence, leaving behind a fellow countryman because they believed the man’s fear of 
escaping would delay their progress. After successfully negotiating a minefield and with 
the assistance of an Arab who provided them with water and directions, they reached the 
Allied forces at Alexandria after 17 nights in the desert.116  
 
In the case of Ben Hermer, escape and braving the desert was motivated by love 
as well as a desire for liberty. At first he tried to settle into camp life by petitioning the 
camp commander to provide better hygiene facilities, and used his medical knowledge in 
an attempt to ease prisoners’ suffering. A devout Jew, he also organised religious services 
on Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur. When the transports to Italy began, Hermer was 
desperate not to leave the continent because he received news that his fiancé was missing 
somewhere in Germany. While prisoners were lining up to go on board ships, Hermer’s 
anxiety got the better of him and he told the camp commander that one of the POWs 
had contracted typhoid. The commander, already impatient with Hermer, was forced to 
take action and because the Italians went looking for the non-existent patient, Hermer 
simply walked out of the camp. On his way to Allied lines, Hermer’s life, like other 
escaped POWs, depended on the goodwill of the local people and in this case Hermer 
spent several days with a Senussi family, recovering from dysentery and waiting for news 
about Allied advances. Following his rescue by Allied forces, he flew to Cairo, where by 
extraordinary coincidence he came across is fiancé, who had escaped from Nazi 
Germany with her mother.117 
 
Conclusion  
 
POW experience in North Africa was marked by a range of aspects that can be 
categorised as common to most POWs. In chronological order these included the chaos 
and confusion during the battle; and the negative perceptions about those in command. 
Once captured, most South Africans experienced shock and humiliation and in this 
confused state they identified to some extent with German soldiers, mainly because of 
the shared disrespect of Italian forces, which in some cases was motivated by perceptions 
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of race. In some instances, POW testimony reveals a more sympathetic view of their 
Italian captors, but this is probably due to the influence of their later experiences in Italy 
when they became dependant on Italians for their survival. The negative attitude towards 
Italians resulted in many POWs finding it extremely difficult to accept their POW status 
and probably led to confrontations with Italian and Senussi guards that held harmful 
consequences for POWs.  
 
Most POW’s coped with the deplorable conditions in the camps in a similar manner, 
realising that friendship and trust was the determining factor. It was during this time that 
prisoners established their POW identities, either as team players or as loners who would 
be looked upon suspiciously because the sharing of food became a necessary part of life. 
The unique experience can be distinguished from the general experience in how the 
POWs chose to react to their circumstances, and this is seen most prominently in each 
prisoner’s decision to escape or not to escape; or on the other hand, to attempt to speed 
up or delay his departure to Italy. It was also during this time that white South African 
POWs especially, began to set themselves apart from the other white Commonwealth 
POWs, albeit in minor ways. For the most part, in North Africa the uniqueness of the 
South African POWs depended on whether they were English or Afrikaans-speaking, 
allowing them to identify or even sympathise with German forces to a greater or lesser 
extent. For most English-speaking South Africans there were more similarities than 
differences between Commonwealth forces, but for some Afrikaans speakers, the 
dividing line was clear, as was the case with Oosthuizen who admitted that life in POW 
camps was difficult for all, but nevertheless emphasised that language played an 
important role when it came to coping with difficult situations.118 
  
Abstract 
 
South African prisoners of war (POWs) captured at Tobruk in June 1942 experienced 
similar events and conditions. All shared a feeling of shock at becoming POWs and all of 
them had to deal with extremely difficult living conditions in prison camps. Attitudes 
towards their enemies, German or Italian, were for the most part very similar among 
POWs, although differences can to an extent be ascribed to the home language or family 
ancestry of the specific POW in question. On the other hand, attitudes towards fellow 
POWs, especially between black and white, cannot be generalised, and each case needs to 
be assessed individually. Characteristics unique to South African POWs are even more 
difficult to identify because the South Africa forces were a very diverse group, with the 
only distinguishing factor being that of language. When discerning between the general 
experience and the individual experiences, it is important to separate the circumstances 
from the POWs reactions to those circumstances, because the circumstances represent 
the general experience and the reaction to such situations represents the individual 
experience. 
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Opsomming 
 
Narratiewe uit Noord Afrika: Die ervaringe van Suid-Afrikaanse krygsgevangenes 
na die val van Tobruk, Junie 1942 
 
Die Suid-Afrikaners wat in Junie 1942 tydens die val van Tobruk gevange geneem is, het 
almal gelyksoortige ervarings en omstandighede beleef. Elkeen het die skok van 
gevangeneming ervaar en almal moes in haglike omstandighede in gevangekampe oorleef. 
Die krygsgevangenes se houding teenoor die vyand, Duits of Italiaans, was oor die 
algemeen redelik vergelykbaar. Die onderskeid wat daar wel was, kan tot ŉ mate 
toegeskryf word aan die verskil in huistaal en familie-afkoms tussen die spesifieke 
krygsgevanges. Wat die verhoudinge tussen krygsgevanges betref, veral tussen wit en 
swart, kan geen veralgemenings gemaak word nie en elke geval moet individueel 
ondersoek word. Omdat die Suid-Afrikaners so ŉ diverse groep was, met taal een van die 
min onderskeidende faktore, is dit besonder moeilik om eienskappe te identifiseer wat 
uniek was aan hulle. Wanneer daar tussen die algemene en individuele ervaring onderskei 
word, is dit belangrik om ŉ onderskeid te tref tussen die omstandighede en die reaksies 
op die omstandighede omdat die omstandighede die algemene ervaring verteenwoordig 
terwyl die reaksie daarop die individuele ervaring verteenwoordig. 
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Afrikaanse Infanteriedivisie; Generaal-Majoor H.B. Klopper; Westelike Woestynveldtog; 
laer range; Tobruk; Benghazi; Gazala; Mersa Matruh; Derna; gevangeneming; 
ontvlugting; Duitse magte; Italiaanse magte.  
 
